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Abstract 
Confidence and career choices: An experiment* 
 
Confidence in one’s own abilities is often seen as an important determinant of 
being successful. Empirical evidence about how such beliefs about one’s own abili-
ties causally influence choices is, however, sparse. In this paper, we use a stylized 
laboratory experiment to investigate the causal effect of an increase in confidence 
on two important choices made by workers in the labor market: (i) choosing be-
tween jobs with a payment scheme that depends heavily on ability [high earnings 
risk] and those that pay a fixed wage [low earnings risk], and (ii) the subsequent 
choice of how much effort to exert within the job. We find that an exogenous in-
crease in confidence leads to an increase in subjects’ propensity to choose pay-
ment schemes that depend heavily on ability. This is detrimental for low ability 
workers due to high baseline levels of confidence. 
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1 Introduction
Confidence in one’s own abilities is commonly thought to be an important determinant of
success. A large body of work has studied the channels through which holding overconfi-
dent beliefs may be beneficial. For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003) provide a
discussion of how a higher level of self-confidence can motivate individuals to work harder,
overcome obstacles, and take beneficial risks. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) argue that
individuals may hold upward-biased beliefs in order to enjoy the consumption value of a
rose-tinted view of the future (and present and past), while Köszegi (2006) studies the be-
havior of individuals who derive ego-utility from overconfident beliefs. In complement to
these theoretical discussions, a growing empirical literature has studied various mechanisms
through which confidence can contribute to an individual’s success. This literature presents
evidence suggesting that more confident individuals are better at persuading others that they
are of high ability (Burks et al., 2013; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 2019; Solda et al.,
2019), work harder (Puri and Robinson, 2007; Pikulina et al., 2017; Chen and Schildberg-
Hörisch, 2019), and that overconfidence is an adaptive evolutionary trait (Bernardo and
Welch, 2001; Heifetz et al., 2007; Johnson and Fowler, 2011).
This view is in stark contrast with the standard Bayesian rational agent perspective – for
a rational Bayesian, more accurate beliefs are always better. Less accurate beliefs lead to
more mistakes, which results in a loss of utility. A substantial body of theoretical and em-
pirical evidence has documented some of the costly mistakes that overconfident individuals
may make, such as exposing themselves to excessive risk (relative to their risk preferences)
in financial markets (Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001), poor managerial decisions
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005), or over-entry into competition (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011).
Despite the wealth of evidence documenting the widespread existence of overconfidence
(see, e.g., Moore and Healy, 2008) and the prominence of overconfidence as one of the most
commonly studied behavioral biases (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2016), causal evidence
relating an exogenous shift in overconfidence to a change in behaviour is relatively sparse.1
Yet, without causal evidence of the effect of confidence on decisions in a particular domain,
one can neither claim that increasing someone’s confidence is beneficial, nor that it is detri-
mental. Any observed correlation between individual heterogeneity in overconfidence and
behavior or outcomes could simply be driven by other unobserved characteristics that gen-
erate the behavior or outcomes. More broadly, a large set of economic models postulate that
1Some notable exceptions to this include papers that create exogenous variation in one’s belief in oneself
by varying the feedback individuals receive such as in Schwardmann and Van der Weele (2019) and Chen
and Schildberg-Hörisch (2019) or by varying reasons for self-selection into the experiment e.g. Camerer and
Lovallo (1999).
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economic behavior in the presence of uncertainty operates as follows: new information ar-
rives→A beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule→B choices are then prescribed by these
posterior beliefs. There has been a considerable effort invested recently in investigating the
first relationship (→A), namely in testing the descriptive validity of the way belief formation
has been modeled traditionally, and trying to improve on it.2 However, less attention has
been paid to the second relationship (→B), namely whether a shift in beliefs actually trans-
lates into a shift in choices in the way that traditional models predict. Here, we attempt
to contribute to this effort of studying experimentally how a shift in beliefs translates into
changes in action choices.
In this paper, we use a stylized career choice game to study several channels through
which an exogenous shift in beliefs may operate. We develop a simple theoretical framework
and show empirically how an upward shift in confidence can causally influence decision-
making regarding the subject’s preferred payment scheme, effort provision, and resulting
earnings.
The following illustrative example provides the intuition for how an increase in confi-
dence can affect decision making in a labor market setting. Imagine a computer program-
mer who is about to graduate from college (let’s call her “Taylor”). Taylor is well educated.
She has the choice between two types of jobs: (1) a job at a mid-sized company that will
pay her a fixed wage, and (2) working at a start-up where her earnings will depend heavily
on her performance. She will earn far more at the startup if she is better than the average
competing programmer who is also graduating from college and far less if she is worse.
Assume that Taylor, like many other people, believes that she is better than average (see,
amongst others Kruger (1999); Burson et al. (2006); Healy and Moore (2007); Moore and
Healy (2008); Benoît et al. (2015)). This belief may be influential for two of her decisions.
First, she needs to choose the type of job that she thinks will be a good fit for her. Second,
conditional on being in the job, she needs to decide how much effort to exert.
For the first choice of which job to take, most models would posit that the higher her
confidence in her own ability, the more likely she is to choose to work at the start-up.3
Choosing to work at the start-up is the payoffmaximizing choice if her ability level is actually
above average, but harmful, if she wrongly believes she is better than average.
With regards to her second choice of how much effort to exert within the job, however,
an inflated level of confidence could motivate her to work harder in the start-up. The reason
for this is that when individuals payment depends on their ability to produce, the returns
2See, for example, work by Grether (1980), Eil and Rao (2011), Möbius et al. (2014), Benjamin (2019),
Coutts (2019), Heger and Papageorge (2018) and Barron (2020) amongst many others.
3However, risk aversion might temper this inclination to choose start-up work by pushing Taylor towards
the less risky job, thereby offsetting the influence of her high confidence to some degree (see, e.g., Bonin et al.
(2007)).
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to effort are proportional to their ability. An inflated view of their own ability implies an
upward shift in their perceived returns to effort. However, if this confidence turns out to
be misguided, the individual’s motivation to exert a high effort level may also be misguided
and she may have been better off conserving some of her energy for other activities. It is of
interest to evaluate empirically whether a shift in an individual’s confidence does actually
translate into a shift in the individuals actions in the way that these models typically describe
it should - i.e. whether the common theoretical relationship between beliefs and choices
provides an accurate descriptive picture of actual behavior.
Ideally, one would study these questions using survey data of real job and effort choices.
However, this approach poses several challenges. One issue is that it is non-trivial to gain
access to accurate measurements of the beliefs, effort choices and payment scheme prefer-
ences of job seekers, holding demand side factors constant. Further, even if one does have
access to these high-quality data for these variables, it is not easy to find a natural experi-
ment that provides an exogenous shock to these beliefs. We circumvent these issues using
a laboratory experiment, which allows us full control over the environment. Doing this,
we generate exogenous variation in beliefs to measure the causal effect of a shift in beliefs
on (i) the selection into fixed [low earnings risk] or ability-contingent [high earnings risk]
payment schemes, and (ii) effort exerted within a given incentive scheme. We derive our
hypotheses for the experiment from a simple theoretical framework.
In the experiment, participants are divided into groups of ten. Each participant takes a
test measuring their cognitive ability. This serves as our measurement of the participant’s
ability. They are then asked to estimate their belief about the probability that their IQ test
performance was in the Top Half of their group of ten. We are interested in studying how
a shift in the belief about their place in the ability distribution translates into decisions for
job and effort choices made by the participants. We designed the experiment such that:
(i) the ability distribution is held constant across treatments, and (ii) the influence of the
individual’s ability on her payoff is fixed prior to her payment scheme and effort choices.
We therefore fix the participant’s ability and belief about their ability (confidence) at the
beginning of the experiment, and examine how it affects the decisions that follow.
After completing the IQ test, participants complete ten rounds of a mundane real-effort
task that is chosen to reflect pure effort, and have little dependence on ability. In each round,
except the first, participants must choose to be compensated for their effort according to
one of two available payment schemes. Subjects can either choose to work for an ability-
contingent piece rate or a fixed piece rate that does not depend on their ability. The ability-
contingent piece rate pays a high wage if the subject is in the Top Half of her group in the
IQ test at the beginning of the experiment and nothing if she is in the Bottom Half. The
fixed risk-free piece rate increases in each round, but always lies below the high piece rate
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of the ability-contingent piece rate. Thus, if a subject is highly confident of being in the Top
Half of her group, choosing the ability-contingent piece rate maximizes her earnings.
The exogenous variation in beliefs about relative ability is generated in the experiment
by exposing the entire group of ten participants to either a harder or an easier version of
the IQ test (participants only interact with other participants who faced the same test).
Subjects randomly assigned to the easy test condition are expected to assess their relative
rank in the IQ test to be higher than subjects assigned to the difficult test condition. This is
commonly referred to as the ‘hard-easy’ effect (Kruger, 1999; Moore and Kim, 2003; Moore
and Small, 2007; Healy and Moore, 2007; Dargnies et al., 2019). The underlying idea is
that individuals fail to fully appreciate that when they find a test easy [difficult], the test is
likely to also be easy [difficult] for all participants, not just for themselves. They therefore
adjust their estimate of their own score more than they adjust their estimate of others’ scores,
which leads to a predictable (and biased) shift in their estimate of their relative rank.
A closely related concept to the hard-easy effect that can also generate overconfidence
is “reference group neglect”, where subjects under-respond to a change in the group’s com-
position (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Schüssler et al., 2018). Both the hard-easy effect and
reference group neglect assert that subjects neglect the fact that there is a shift in the back-
ground distribution against which they are being compared. The hard-easy effect refers to
a neglect of the fact that changing the difficulty of the test will lead to a shift in the distri-
bution of others’ scores. In contrast, reference group neglect refers to neglect of a shift in
the distribution of other’s scores due to a particular subset of individuals selecting into par-
ticipation.⁴ Both of these mechanisms can result in the distorted belief that one is ranked
higher than one actually is, which is commonly referred to as “overplacement”, and which
may then influence decision making in important contexts.⁵
In our study, we find evidence that a small shift in the difficulty of the test leads to a large
shift in the average belief that subjects holds regarding their relative placement. The effect
is particularly strong for subjects who are actually in the Bottom Half of the group. These
subjects report higher beliefs on average in the easy treatment than in the hard treatment.
The beliefs of those in the Top Half are less affected on average.
In terms of this shift in beliefs translating into actions, we find that this increase in con-
fidence due to exposure to the easier test leads subjects to choose the ability-contingent
piece rate more often. If randomly confronted with the hard test, subjects are more likely to
⁴Both these concepts fall into the broader important class of biases, where subjects neglect some feature of
the data generating process, leading to biased inference and systematic mistakes in decision making. Notable
examples include correlation neglect and selection neglect (see, e.g., Jehiel, 2018; Barron et al., 2019; Enke and
Zimmermann, 2019; Enke, 2020). Reference group neglect could be viewed as a form of selection neglect.
⁵As opposed to “overprecision”, overconfidence in the accuracy of one’s beliefs, and “overestimation”, the
overconfidence in one’s absolute ability (Moore and Healy, 2008).
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choose the fixed piece rate. This shift in job choice occurs even though the incentives faced
remain constant. This suggests that the way that knowledge is tested within an education
system could have implications for the later choices made by individuals, holding the funda-
mental levels of their knowledge and abilities constant. With regard to effort, we find that
in our experiment the motivation level of participants tends is high, and largely insensitive
to their beliefs, implying we do not observe a shift in effort choices.
The shift in beliefs has important consequences for earnings of the Bottom Half of the
group. This group earns only about a quarter of what the top group earns on average, but
their average earnings are reduced even further, by about 40 percent, when their confidence
has been exogenously increased. The reason for this is that overconfidence in relative ability
is costly for below-average-ability individuals, as it increases their probability of choosing
an ability-contingent incentive scheme, which is a mistake for these individuals.
An additional important contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence towards
addressing one of the challenges in the literature studying beliefs: understanding the causal
mapping of beliefs to economic decisions. Many papers take as given that beliefs have a
simple linear causal mapping to decisions, and yet in the few papers that have investigated
this relationship, the results are not so straight forward.⁶ Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
(2008), for example, show that subjects in their games fail to best-respond to their stated
beliefs almost half of the time, providing evidence for the fact that beliefs do not directly
map in a simple way into actions. However, in a later follow-up paper, the authors introduce
exogenous variation in beliefs within a trust game to demonstrate that elicited beliefs have
a causal impact on choices in that domain (Costa-Gomes et al., 2014). In the context of a
repeated public goods game, Smith (2013) also provides evidence of a causal effect of beliefs
on actions. In that context, Smith (2013) argues that the magnitude of the causal effect he
estimates using an IV approach is about half the size of the effect that would be estimated
if using OLS and not accounting for the endogeneity of the beliefs. Together, these papers
show that the relationship between elicited beliefs and observed actions is not always as
expected, and further empirical investigation is warranted across different domains. This
paper contributes to this exercise.
Our paper also contributes to the literature that studies the relationship between be-
liefs about relative ability and stylized labor market choices, such as career choices, ef-
fort provision, willingness to compete and risk-taking behavior (e.g. Camerer and Lovallo,
1999; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Bruhin et al., 2018; Cheung
⁶In a recent paper, Fischer and Sliwka (2018) distinguish between confidence in the level of one’s ability
and confidence in one’s ability to learn (i.e. their ability production function). Using feedback to generate
variation in beliefs, they show that an increase in one’s belief about their ability to learn increases motivation
to learn, while an increase in their belief about their ability level reduces motivation.
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and Johnstone, 2017; Pikulina et al., 2016, 2017; Chen and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2019).⁷
Dohmen and Falk (2011), for example, also study the choice between a variable and fixed-
payment wage scheme. The authors show that individual characteristics, such as relative
self-assessment and risk aversion are important predictors of how individuals sort into the
different incentive schemes. Our paper differs from this body of work in a two important
ways. First, we focus attention solely on the causal effect of a shift in beliefs, while holding
the true ability distribution constant. Second, our design separates the measurement of abil-
ity and effort, allowing us to fix the individual’s ability measurement and influence on her
payoff prior to facing the different incentive schemes (i.e. we hold the ability component of
the production function fixed). Our design therefore rules out the possibility of substituting
lack of ability with effort, and allows us to isolate the influence of a belief shift on effort,
without it being obscured by heterogeneous ability.
Our experimental design is related in spirit to Camerer and Lovallo (1999), who study
entry into competition due to underestimating one’s competitors. In their experiment, in-
dividuals are either informed or not informed during recruitment into the experiment that
they will be competing against other subjects in a skill-based task. This information leads
to more self-selection into the experiment based on performance level in the informed treat-
ment and subsequent over-entry into a skill-based competition. All the high-skilled, highly
competitive individuals select into the experiment, and then select into competing within
the experiment. They fail to recognize that others are behaving in the same way and so
they are not competing against a random draw from the population. Importantly, the re-
sults they observe are not necessarily caused by overconfidence, since overconfidence might
co-vary with other individual characteristics that contribute both to the self-selection into
the experiment and into competing.⁸ This observation does not diminish the contribution
of the study, since in many real world settings, overconfidence is likely to co-vary with these
unobserved factors in the same way. We view our paper as providing complementary evi-
dence to the insightful work cited above by focusing on the narrower question of isolating
the role played by purely by confidence. Our paper also demonstrates a method that may be
used to examine the causal role played by a shift in confidence on actions in other domains.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
framework and hypotheses, section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 discusses
the results, and section 5 concludes.
⁷Furthermore, Huck et al. (2018) consider how individuals might endogenously manage their own beliefs
in order to motivate themselves to perform better in a real effort task.
⁸This is supported by the fact that a replication by Dankova and Servatka (2019) which extends Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) by studying both men and women (since the original study focuses on men) finds that the
results are highly sensitive to the participants gender.
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2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we motivate the experimental design and hypotheses through means of a
simple model where a worker chooses her payment scheme and then effort. The objective of
the theoretical framework is to simply provide some discipline and precision to the ensuing
discussion. To do this, we augment the model used by DellaVigna and Pope (2017) in their
large-scale study of real effort and motivation.
Consider an individual i, who can earn money by performing a task that requires costly
effort, e. She is either a high ability or low ability individual, a ∈ {aL, aH}. Prior to per-
forming the task, the individual chooses between two incentive schemes: (i) one where
high-ability individuals will earn a high wage, w(aH) = wH , and low-ability individuals will
earn a low wage, w(aL) = wL, or (ii) one that pays a fixed wage to everyone, w̄, where
wH > w̄ > wL. After choosing her incentive scheme, she chooses the level of effort, e, she
would like to exert. Following DellaVigna and Pope (2017) we allow the subject to derive
some intrinsic utility from effort, denoted by s.⁹
A risk-neutral individual would choose her incentive scheme, w ∈ {w̄, w(a)}, and effort
level, e, by solving the following:
max
w∈{w̄,w(a)}
max
e≥0
Ea[(s+w) · e− c(e)] (1)
where c(e) is the cost of exerting effort, and is assumed to satisfy c′(e)> 0 and c′′(e)>
0. The expectation operator, Ea, denotes the expectation with respect to the individual’s
ability, and s represents the individual’s intrinsic motivation for completing the task. Since
uncertainty about one’s own ability is only directly relevant for the wage schedule, we can
rewrite equation 1:
max
w∈{w̄,w(a)}
max
e≥0
(s+ Ea[w]) · e− c(e) (2)
Equation 2 shows that the individual’s subjective belief regarding the likelihood that
she is high-ability, π̂ = P̂(a = aH), is important both for her decision of which incentive
scheme to take, and howmuch effort to exert if she chooses the ability-contingent incentives.
Essentially, the choice of an incentive scheme involves a choice between being paid a certain
piece rate of Ea[w̄] = w̄, or an expected piece rate of Ea[w(a)] = π̂ · wH for each unit of
effort. We normalise wH = 1.
⁹As in DellaVigna and Pope (2017), we view this intrinsic motivation term as capturing, in reduced form,
any non-monetary reward the workers derive from working on the task. In terms of the laboratory experiment
described below, this is taken to include any sense of duty to, or gratitude towards the experimenter for the
fixed show-up fee. DellaVigna and Pope (2017) argue that this non-monetary reward term is important for
explaining the commonly observed non-zero effort in fixed-wage laboratory experiments.
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The effort choice
Conditional on the choice of an incentive scheme, w, the individual chooses effort, e∗, ac-
cording to the condition c′(e∗) = s + Ea[w]. Under the certain piece rate (PR) incentive
scheme she chooses e∗PR = c
′−1(s + w̄). Under the ability-contingent (AC) incentive scheme,
she chooses e∗AC = c
′−1(s + π̂ · wH). If her confidence is sufficiently low (i.e. she believes
the probability that she is high ability is below the following threshold: π̂ < w̄wH ), then the
individual exerts more effort under the certain piece rate incentives. However, if she is suffi-
ciently confident in her own ability, such that π̂ > w̄wH she expects a higher piece rate under
ability-contingent incentives, and would work harder under these incentives. We therefore
define a threshold belief, namely πe := w̄wH , such that:
• For low beliefs (i.e. if π̂ ∈ [0,πe]), the individual exerts more effort under certain
piece rate incentives than under ability-contingent incentives.
• For high beliefs (i.e. if π̂ ∈ [πe, 1]), the individual exerts more effort under ability-
contingent incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
Importantly, for high levels of intrinsic motivation, s, differences in effort due to variation
in monetary incentive schemes will be harder to detect. This is a common feature of labora-
tory real effort tasks (DellaVigna and Pope, 2017; Erkal et al., 2016; de Araujo et al., 2015).
The time limit of the task constrains effort to be below a certain effort level, e ≤ ē, which can
be binding if ē ≤ e∗PR and ē ≤ e
∗
AC (e.g. this occurs when the intrinsic incentives are strong
enough to maintain effort close to the boundary under both sets of monetary incentives).
If this is the case, then the observed effort level chosen under both sets of incentives will
be equal. As we will see in the results below, in our experiment the intrinsic motivation to
exert effort appears to have been high and we do not observe substantial variation in effort
across incentive schemes. While this reduces the informativeness of the lessons that we can
draw about effort choices under different incentive schemes in our experiment, it has the
advantage of allowing us to study the relationship between beliefs and the incentive choice
decisions more cleanly, since effort choices are largely held constant.
The incentive scheme choice
When choosing between incentives schemes, the individual chooses the ability-contingent
incentives whenever she expects to earn more per unit of effort under them than she would
under the certain piece rate per unit of effort.
(s+ π̂ ·wH) · e∗AC − c(e
∗
AC)≥ (s+ w̄) · e
∗
PR − c(e
∗
PR) (3)
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This inequality holds whenever π̂ ·wH ≥ w̄.1⁰ It holds even if the effort level chosen un-
der both incentives schemes is the same (i.e. if e∗ = ē). Under risk neutrality, the threshold
for the choice of incentives, and the threshold for effort choices are equal (i.e. πi = πe = w̄wH ).
We can therefore summarise the influence of beliefs on choices as follows:
• a low confidence individual (i.e. one with a belief π̂ ∈ [0,πi]) will (i) choose the certain
piece rate incentives, and (ii) exert (weakly) lower effort under ability-contingent
incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
• a high confidence individual (i.e. one with a belief π̂ ∈ (πi, 1]) will (i) choose the
ability-contingent incentives, and (ii) exert (weakly) higher effort under ability-contingent
incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
In Appendix A.1.2, we relax the risk neutrality assumption and show that the threshold
belief at which individuals will switch incentive choice differs from the one at which effort
is affected by incentives.
2.1 Hypotheses
The theoretical framework above provides us with a set of hypotheses that we will test in
the experiment. The central objective is to ask how a shift in confidence about one’s own
ability affects incentive scheme choices and effort choices. To do this, in the experiment,
we use the well established Hard-Easy effect (see, e.g., Moore and Healy, 2008) to induce
exogenous variation in subject’s beliefs about their own ability, π̂, keeping everything else
constant (e.g. actual ability, a).
In the experiment, it is reasonable to expect heterogeneous beliefs. Therefore we con-
sider a continuum of agents who hold beliefs, distributed on the unit interval, π̂ ∼ F(π̂),
such that f (π̂) is everywhere positive on π̂ ∈ [0,1]. Since evaluating our main hypotheses
relies on our experimental design generating exogenous variation in beliefs across treat-
ments, our first hypothesis tests whether we observe a shift in beliefs due to the hard-easy
effect in our experiment:
Hypothesis 1. (Shift in Beliefs): Beliefs about one’s own relative ability in the Easy treatment
will be higher on average than beliefs in the Hard treatment.
1⁰To see this, notice that if π̂ ·wH > w̄, the individual could simply choose the ability-contingent incentives
and set effort equal to the optimal effort level under certain piece rate incentives, e = e∗PR, and receive a higher
expected payoff than under the certain piece rate incentives, i.e.
(s+ π̂ ·wH) · e∗PR − c(e
∗
PR)≥ (s+ w̄) · e
∗
PR − c(e
∗
PR)
Since e = e∗AC maximises the LHS of this inequality, equation 3 must also hold.
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Our second hypothesis tests whether incentive scheme choices are affected by the hy-
pothesized shift in beliefs between treatments. The logic behind this hypothesis is that
individuals who hold a higher belief in their own ability are more likely to choose the ability-
contingent incentives – i.e. an upward shift in π̂ for all individuals implies that π̂≥ w̄wH will
hold for a greater fraction of individuals.
Hypothesis 2. (Incentive Choices): An exogenous increase in confidence will lead to a higher
fraction of individuals choosing the ability-contingent incentives.
Third, we ask how a shift in beliefs affects effort choices. We consider two scenarios: one
in which the intrinsic motive to exert effort is high and the elasticity with respect to extrinsic
monetary incentives is low, and one in which the intrinsic motive is low and therefore the
elasticity with respect to extrinsic monetary incentives is high.
In the scenario where the intrinsic motive to exert effort is sufficiently high (as it is in
much of the experimental literature involving real effort in the lab) an increase in confi-
dence will not change effort. In the scenario where subjects are predominantly motivated
by extrinsic monetary rewards in their effort choices, the more confident individuals will
exert more effort under ability-contingent incentives.
Hypothesis 3. (Effort Choices): We will observe one of the following two patterns of behavior
for effort choices. Either: (i) [low intrinsic motivation] For high confidence individuals, effort
choices will be higher under the ability-contingent incentives than under the certain piece rate
incentives. In this scenario, an upward shift in confidence will increase overall average effort.
(ii) [high intrinsic motivation] Effort choices will not be influenced by the incentive scheme. In
this scenario, an exogenous shift in confidence will not affect effort choices.
Ultimately, we also want to examine the effect that an upwards shift in confidence has
on earnings. Within each treatment in our experiment, individuals are classified into two
groups – high and low ability. An upward shift in beliefs is likely to lead to a very different
effect on outcomes individuals in these two groups. Essentially, individuals who are actually
of high ability benefit from an upward shift in confidence as this leads to them switching
towards the ability-contingent incentive scheme more often. The reverse is true for low-
ability individuals. The boost in confidence can be harmful for them as they may switch to
the ability-contingent incentive scheme even though it results in a loss of earnings. Appendix
section A.1.1 contains a more detailed discussion of this intuition, and the Hypothesis 4
below summarizes the main testable implications:
Hypothesis 4. (Earnings): While an increase in confidence will have an ambiguous effect on
average earnings, the framework suggests that: (i) it will lead to weakly lower average earnings
for low-ability individuals, (ii) it will lead to weakly higher average earnings for high-ability
individuals, and (iii) it will increase earnings inequality overall.
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3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design aims, firstly, to assess how an agent’s confidence in her relative
ability causally affects her choice of incentive scheme for a subsequent real effort task. This
mirrors the labour market decision of whether to pursue employment that is highly depen-
dent on one’s ability or not. Secondly, we evaluate the relationship between the agent’s
confidence and her effort provision under the chosen incentives.
An experiment with these objectives should have the following features:
i. An exogenous shift in subjects’ beliefs about their relative ability,
ii. a separation of the role of ability and effort in the production function,
iii. a fine-grained measurement of a participant’s willingness to switch from a fixed incen-
tive scheme to an ability-contingent scheme
3.1 Overview of the experimental timeline
Our experiment is designed with these features in mind. Figure 1 outlines the timeline of the
experiment. The first part of the experiment obtains a baseline measure of the participants’
willingness to exert effort for a fixed wage. This stage is implemented prior to treatment,
and therefore provides a control measure of effort that is unaffected by the hard-easy task
assignment. Next, the ability task is the stage in which the treatment is introduced, with
participants either exposed to a hard or easy version of the ability task. In each session,
subjects are randomized into two groups of ten. One group completes the hard task, and
one completes the easy task. The reason for this is to have within-session randomization as
it is important to control for session fixed effects, but participants never interact with the
participants in the other group. After the ability task, we elicit participants’ beliefs about
their relative placement in the group. Thereafter, they proceed to the main effort task.
In this task, participants face ten rounds of the completing the effort task under either a
fixed wage or an ability-contingent wage. In each round, except the first, participants first
choose one of the two wage structures, and then exert effort. The ability-contingent wage
stays constant in every round, while the fixed wage is ratcheted up in order to provide a fine-
grained measure of the participant’s indifference point. The experiment concludes with a
measurement of subjects risk preferences and the questionnaire. We provide further details
on each of the components of the experiment in the following sections.
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Figure 1: Sequence of experimental parts
Effort Practice
1 minute
Effort Baseline
8 minutes
Ability Task
4 minutes
Beliefs
Effort Main Task
10 × 2 minutes
Risk
Questionnaire
3.2 The ability and the effort measurement tasks
The main components of the experiment are the “Ability Task”, used to measure a, and the
“Effort Main Task”, used to measure e. One challenge for an experiment of this nature is that
it is non-trivial to measure ability11 and effort12 separately. We explicitly try to address this
issue by using two separate tasks—one that we view as depending more on the individual’s
ability, and less on the effort she exerts; and one that depends more on effort, and less on
her ability. We contend that this choice of tasks provides us with a reasonably clean measure
of these two variables of interest.
The ability task
The “Ability Task” consists of a test that is often used to measure IQ, namely Raven Progres-
sive Matrices.13 Subjects have four minutes to solve as many matrices as they can. Subjects
can go back and forth between the 12 matrices and can change their answers until the time
is up. Every correct answer yields one point, and there are no negative points for wrong
answers. We chose not to directly incentivize the task for two reasons. First, IQ tests tend
to induce an intrinsic motive to perform well. Second, we wanted to limit the role of hedg-
ing in influencing the belief elicitation. Importantly, the motive to perform well faced by
subjects should not differ between the two treatments, because at this point of doing the IQ
task, subjects did not know that they would be incentivized for accurate beliefs at a later
time—this is to prevent them from intentionally performing poorly.
The effort task
While the “Ability Task” was chosen such that the limiting factor in participants’ performance
is their ability, the “Effort Task” was chosen to be a task where ability plays a minor role
11We view ability, a, as being a fixed characteristic of the individual that she cannot change during the time
frame of the experiment.
12We view effort, e, as a being a malleable object that the participant has full control over.
13A matrix consists of nine related patterns of which one is missing. Below the matrix, there are eight
possible patterns to complete the set of nine. Subjects have to find the one piece that best completes the set.
There is only one correct answer. Due to the short time frame for solving up to 12 matrices, performance
depends mostly on cognitive ability. Subjects are either skilled at finding the missing pattern or not. Every
matrix is shown on its own screen.
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and all participants have a lot of control over their performance (i.e. performance depends
predominantly on how motivated the individual is in exerting effort). For this purpose, we
adopted the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012). Using the mouse, participants move
sliders on the screen from position zero to position 50. Sliders are shown in sets of 20.
When all 20 sliders are set to 50 the subject can click the submit button and the sliders are
reset to zero for a new round. In Section 3.5 below, we discuss the incentives subjects face.
Since the treatment is introduced during the “Ability Task” phase of the experiment, we
also measure each individual’s baseline effort level prior to treatment under fixed piece rate
incentives. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it allows us to check for balance of effort in
the slider task between treatment groups, prior to the treatment manipulation. Secondly,
it allows us to control for baseline effort levels when assessing the impact of the treatment,
thereby reducing unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
3.3 Treatment variation
The objective of the treatment variation is to exogenously shift confidence using a minimal
intervention. Therefore, the two treatment conditions are completely identical except for
a slight difference in the difficulty of the Ability Task. Within each session, subjects are
randomly assigned to one of two groups. One entire group is exposed to a harder version,
and the other group to an easier version of the Raven Progressive Matrices. Eight of the
twelve puzzles are identical in both treatments. The remaining four are either slightly easier
or slightly harder than the rest. Table 1 shows the precise sequence of Raven matrices faced
in each of the treatment groups. In each of the four differences, switching a C-matrix for
an E-matrix represents an increase in difficulty. Moving backwards and forwards between
puzzles is allowed in the task. Subjects only interact with other participants who completed
exactly the same test as them (i.e. in their treatment group of ten subjects), and they know
this.1⁴
Table 1: Treatment variation in ability task
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
High (Easy) C1 C3 D7 C6 D8 C2 D6 C5 C7 C12 C4 D4
Low (Hard) E4 E12 D7 C6 D8 E6 D6 C5 C7 E1 C4 D4
same / different 6= 6= = = = 6= = = = 6= = =
This approach draws on the finding in the psychology literature that when the difficulty
1⁴Our experiment uses within-session assignment to treatment in order to avoid the numerous potential
issues associated with between-session randomization.
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of a task increases, this causes a downward shift in an individual’s confidence regarding their
relative position in the ability distribution. Conversely, facing an easier task makes individ-
uals more confident regarding their position in the distribution (Burson et al., 2006; Healy
and Moore, 2007; Larrick et al., 2007; Moore and Healy, 2008; Bordley et al., 2014; Benoît
et al., 2015). Importantly, these results assume a constant group composition, so there is no
reason for the individual’s actual rank to change when the difficulty of the test is shifted. An
explanation for this result is that when the difficulty of a test is reduced, individuals find the
test easier and adjust their assessment of their own performance upwards. However, they
do not adjust their belief of the distribution of others’ scores up as much. This results in a
higher relative assessment of their own performance. Kruger (1999) shows that this miscal-
ibration can lead to the majority of subjects evaluating themselves as worse-than-average
in difficult tasks and better-than-average in easy tasks.
In our experiment, we therefore name the treatment in which subjects face the hard test,
the “Low confidence” treatment, and the treatment in which subjects face the easier test,
the “High confidence” treatment.
3.4 The belief elicitation task
After the “Ability Task” we elicit subjects’ beliefs about their relative performance in com-
parison to the 9 other participants in their group who faced the same task as them.1⁵ More
specifically, we asked subjects the following question: “What do you think is the probability
that you scored among the top 5 participants in the IQ picture task?”. In order to give some
guidance in thinking about probabilities, we provided the participants with a scale of possi-
ble answers ranging from “0 - I am certain that I scored in the bottom half” to “100 - I am
certain that I scored in the top half”. Participants were free to state any number from 0 to 100.
Their guess is incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998).1⁶ The quadratic
scoring rule is explained in detail to them in the instructions provided, both on-screen and
on paper. The scoring rule is designed to provide the highest expected payoff when subjects
state their true beliefs. Maximum earnings are €2 for the belief elicitation task. The belief
elicitation came as a surprise at this point in the experiment to prevent subjects artificially
manipulating their earlier “Ability Task” scores in anticipation of the belief elicitation.
1⁵Subjects knew that they were randomly assigned to one of two groups of ten within the session, and that
all the other members of their group faced the same “Ability Task”, however they didn’t know that the other
group faced a different “Ability Task”. It was made clear to them that only their own group’s performance was
relevant for them, and there was no interaction at all between groups.
1⁶We view the usage of both the QSR incentives, and the intuitive descriptions associated with different
probability levels, as providing an appealing compromise approach to the belief elicitation. It allows us to
maintain the appealing theoretical properties of a proper scoring rule, but also provides subjects with an
intuitive and easily understandable guide for answering the question.
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In addition, we asked participants to report their best guess of how many points they
scored in the task and what they believe the 5th highest score in their group is (unincen-
tivized, in order to avoid hedging).
3.5 The wage scheme choice
One central objectives of the experimental design is to evaluate how a shift in confidence
affects subjects’ choices between fixed wage schemes and ability-contingent wage schemes.
The simplest way to do this would be to allow subjects to choose between a single fixed wage
scheme and a single ability-contingent wage scheme. However, with just this binary choice,
a shift in subjects’ beliefs may change their valuation of the two options, but not enough to
lead to a change in choices. In order to obtain a more fine grained measurement of subjects’
precise relative valuation of the two payment schemes, we constructed a task where subjects
make the choice ten times, but the fixed wage is gradually ratcheted up in each successive
choice. Therefore, subjects face ten rounds of two-minute real effort tasks. In each of
these rounds (except the first), subjects can choose whether they would prefer a fixed piece
rate, or whether they want to work under the ability-contingent piece rate. Figure 2 below
summarizes the two wage schemes available in each round. A Subject’s switching point
reveals the round in which they are indifferent between the two wage schemes.
Figure 2: Payment Scheme in Main Effort Task
Another important feature of the experimental design is that the ability component of
the production function is held fixed, and the distribution is the same in the two treatments
(i.e. 50% in the Top Half, and 50% in the Bottom Half). This is done by using the “Ability
Task” to obtain a fixed measurement of ability before the participant reports her belief,
and before she chooses between payment schemes. This implies that differences in beliefs,
incentive-scheme choice and effort can be causally attributed to the shift in beliefs due to
the treatment. It rules out potential issues that can arise if one were to allow participants
to first make an incentive scheme choice, and then produce output that depends on both
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ability and effort. For example, in this case, one would not be able to distinguish a high
ability individual who exerts low effort from a low ability individual who exerts high effort.
There are a few additional features of the payment scheme choice that are worth noting.
First, to rule out learning effects (with respect to own ability), subjects receive no feedback
about either their relative ability score or their performance in any components of the “Effort
Task” tasks until the very end of the experiment. Second, in the initial period, all participants
have to work for the ability-contingent piece rate. This feature allows us to assess how the
shift in confidence affects effort provision when all subjects are forced to work under the
ability-contingent piece rate, thereby avoiding endogenous selection effects—in all other
rounds the incentive scheme that a subject faces is endogenous. Third, the fixed piece rate
increases in each period from €0.15 per 20 sliders in the second period to €0.80 per 20
sliders in the last period. Once the expected earnings from the ability-contingent piece rate
are lower than the fixed piece rate in that period, individuals should switch to the fixed piece
rate and choose it for the remainder of the experiment, assuming risk neutral preferences.1⁷
3.6 The risk elicitation
Finally, we elicit risk preferences by adapting the preferences module on risk taking by Falk
et al. (2016) to our setting. The staircase procedure is essentially equivalent to a traditional
multiple price list, presenting multiple choices between a sure payoff and a gamble, but
simply requires fewer decisions on the part of the subject in comparison to a traditional
price list by avoiding redundant choices. The staircase we use has four choices between a
sure payment and a risky gamble. The outcomes of the risky gamble are always €0 or €1,
each associated with a 50 percent chance of occurring. The sure payment value was varied
across decisions to allow us to elicit the subject’s point of indifference. One of the decisions
1⁷In the end, five of the ten rounds are randomly chosen for payment. Subjects had to answer four control
questions before starting the task to ensure comprehension of the payment scheme. To elicit the baseline
motivation of moving sliders, subjects complete 9 minutes of the “Effort Task” at the start of the experiment,
the first minute being an unincentivized practice round. In the baseline round, we pay €0.30 per 20 sliders,
and all completed sets are paid out.The objectives of the baseline round were the following. Firstly, it allows
subjects to familiarize themselves with the slider task, thereby ameliorating learning effects during the main
effort task. Secondly, it allowed us to obtain a baseline measure of subjects’ effort choices prior to the treatment
variation under fixed incentives. This allows us to check for baseline balance in effort, and also to control for
subjects’ baseline effort at the individual level.
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was randomly chosen for payment.1⁸
At the end of the experiment, we administered a comprehensive questionnaire.
3.7 The procedure
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the WZB-
TU experimental laboratory in 2017. Participants were solicited through an online database
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a subject pool of mostly undergraduate students from all
faculties. In total 100 subjects participated in 5 sessions, 20 in each. 47 of themwere female,
49 male and four chose not to self-report their gender. Subjects received a show-up fee of
€5 plus their earnings from the tasks. Mean earnings for the 60 minutes sessions amounted
to €13.30. The relevant instructions were handed out to participants at the beginning of
each stage and read out loud. Complete instructions as they appeared to participants are
provided in the Online Appendix.
4 Results
4.1 Does the hard-easy treatment shift beliefs?
Themain objective of our treatmentmanipulation is to exogenously shift participants’ beliefs
about their relative performance in the IQ test. In line with Hypothesis 1, Figure 3 shows
that we find a significant difference in the participants’ level of confidence in their own
ability between the two treatment groups, where confidence refers to the individual’s stated
probability of being in the Top Half of their group (t-test, p < 0.01).1⁹ We refer to the easy
task treatment as the High confidence treatment, and the difficult task treatment as the
Low confidence treatment.
Result 1. In line with the previous hard-easy effect literature, reducing the difficulty level of
1⁸We have two more staircases for which we use the subjects’ own reported beliefs as the probability for the
gamble. We do this as it allows us to compare their choices in the risk task with their incentive scheme choices.
While the risk task involves a choice between a pure lottery and a fixed payment, the main task involves the
choices of which payment scheme to work under. Both tasks share the same values of outcomes and subjective
probabilities. Therefore, it allows us to assess whether there are any differences in how probabilities affect
choice tasks and effort tasks. As a caveat, the risk elicitation always comes after the incentive scheme choices,
which could motivate subjects to make consistent choices in the risk task. The third staircase is a mirror of
the second and only used for keeping incentives fair to not favor individuals that stated high beliefs, as high
beliefs increase the chance of winning the gamble.
1⁹The top panel of Table 5, reported in the Appendices, shows that our treatment groups are balanced on
observable characteristics (as would be expected given the within-session randomization). The second panel
confirms that, by design, the ability score differs, but the relative ability distribution is identical between
treatments.
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the ability task increases the average confidence that participants have in their own relative
performance.
Figure 3: Average stated beliefs by treatment
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4.2 The influence of beliefs on wage scheme choices
Next, we present evidence on whether the increase in confidence translates into actions by
increasing the proportion of individuals choosing a high earnings risk wage scheme (i.e. the
ability-contingent wage). This is a test of Hypothesis 2. Figure 4 shows that the ability-
contingent wage is chosen significantly more often in the High treatment condition than in
the Low treatment condition (diff. = 18pp; t-test, p < 0.01).2⁰ The first two columns of
Table 2 show that this result is unaffected by session fixed effects.
Figure 4: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives
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Note: (i) Vertical lines denote 95% CI around the mean.
2⁰Wondering what Taylor would do if she were a man? In Appendix A.3, we analyze the gender heterogene-
ity in the stylized career choices we observe.
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In addition to documenting the treatment effect on choices, it is informative to provide
more direct evidence on whether this treatment effect operated via beliefs. To do this,
columns (3) of Table 2 shows that the subjects’ reported beliefs about their likelihood of
being in the Top Half are highly predictive of their incentive scheme choices (a 1pp in-
crease in a participants’ belief is associated with choosing the ability-contingent incentives
0.86pp more often). However, this relationship may be endogenous. A nice feature of the
experimental design is that we can use the treatment variation as an instrument for beliefs.
Columns (4) and (5) report the results from this exercise, showing that the exogenous shift
in beliefs does indeed translate directly into a change in wage choices. This cleanly demon-
strates a causal relationship between beliefs and action choices in this context, showing that
this result is not driven by other unobserved differences between individuals who hold high
beliefs and low beliefs.
Result 2. An increase in confidence results in a higher propensity to choose the ability-contingent
wage scheme.
Table 2: Propensity to Choose the AC Incentives
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (HIGH=1) 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Subj Belief 0.86∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.26) (0.26)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.21
(0.19)
Constant 0.50∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.07 -0.17
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.22)
Session Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.068 0.462
First-Stage F 13.91 13.88
Notes: (i) In the IV Regressions, Subjective Beliefs are instrumented using the treatment
dummy. (ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Dependent variable: fraction of
AC choices in rounds 2 to 10.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The discussion above has considered wage choices in all rounds pooled together. Figure
5 shows average wage choices in each round separately. As expected, the fraction of ability-
contingent wage choices decreases across rounds in both treatments as the fixed wage rate
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increases. However, in every round the fraction is higher in the High confidence treatment,
with the gap largest in the middle rounds – Table 7 in the Appendix shows that there is a
significant difference in rounds 4 to 8 (t-test, p < 0.05). This is unsurprising since a large
fraction of subjects would need to hold extreme beliefs to generate a large treatment differ-
ence in the first or last round. Overall, the evidence indicates that the shift in confidence
resulted in a substantial change in behavior,
Figure 5: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives (by Round)
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4.3 Influence of beliefs and incentive choice on effort
Once an individual has chosen her incentive scheme, the second choice she has to make is
the choice of how much effort to exert. For this effort choice, our simple theoretical frame-
work yields two sets of mutually exclusive predictions – one for scenarios where intrinsic
motivation is high, and one for scenarios where intrinsic motivation is low.
Taken together, the data collected in our experiment is more consistent with the first sce-
nario. We measure effort using the variable “effort per minute”, which reflects the number
of sliders completed during each minute within a particular round. We find no significant
difference in average effort exerted between treatment groups (see Figure 6 and Table 7
in the Appendix). Further, we present two additional pieces of evidence in favor of the
explanation that intrinsic motivation is high in the experiment.
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Figure 6: Per minute effort in baseline and main task by treatment
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First, we show that effort is not strongly associated with the participant’s expected wage
rate. Figure 7 plots the average per minute effort exerted in the baseline round, as well as
in every subsequent round. While we do see some initial learning, after the baseline round,
there is very little change in effort exerted even though the value of the fixed piece rate
increases from €0.1 to €0.8, and the fraction of individuals choosing this fixed piece rate
incentives increases substantially in both treatment groups between round 2 and round 10.
Figure 7: Effort choices across rounds, by treatment
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Second, we show that effort does not appear to be associated with the participant’s
beliefs evenwhen she is exogenously assigned to the ability-contingent wage scheme. Figure
8 focuses on the first round in which all participants faced the ability-contingent incentive
scheme. This figure shows that in both treatments, effort is highly unresponsive to beliefs.
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While our treatment successfully shifted the beliefs of participants in the two treatments, it
did not affect the relationship between beliefs and effort, which is rather flat.21
Figure 8: Per minute effort in first round under ability-contingent incentives
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Both these results are interesting in light of the fact that we have already seen that there
was a strong causal response of the wage scheme choice to a shift in beliefs. This means
we can rule out the hypothesis that beliefs are generally not meaningful for action choices.
Overall, this evidence is in line with the explanation that the intrinsic motive to exert effort
in the task crowds out the extrinsic motive, resulting in a very low elasticity of effort to
changes in expected monetary rewards.22
Table 3 reiterates these results by examining the correlates of effort in Round 1 (i.e.,
under the ability-contingent wage). Columns (1) and (2) confirm that there is no treatment
difference in effort choices; columns (3) and (4) provide further evidence that there is no
significant relationship between an individuals’ belief and her effort choices. In columns (5)
and (6), we include baseline effort, which was measured prior to the treatment variation
being introduced. We again observe no significant relationship between effort and beliefs.
Result 3. Effort choices are largely unresponsive to shifts in beliefs, and to the participant’s
choice of incentive scheme. The low elasticity of effort to change in the expected monetary
rewards is indicative of a scenario where intrinsic motivation is high.
21This finding is not surprising considering the recent literature on the unresponsiveness of effort to incen-
tives in real-effort lab experiments (de Araujo et al., 2015; Corgnet et al., 2015; DellaVigna and Pope, 2017;
Erkal et al., 2016). Most papers find that there is significant intrinsic motivation to work on the task, regardless
of any incentives.
22It seems hard to imagine a more boring and tedious task thanmoving sliders for 20minutes, but something
even less intrinsically rewarding would be necessary to test our hypothesis without any intrinsic motivation.
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Table 3: Effort Choice (per minute) Under AC Incentives (Round 1)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (HIGH=1) -0.09 -0.09
(0.45) (0.44)
Subj Belief 1.11 -0.46 -2.29 -2.30
(0.79) (2.19) (1.79) (1.79)
Baseline Effort 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.50
(1.37)
Constant 11.32∗∗∗ 11.97∗∗∗ 11.09∗∗∗ 12.27∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗
(0.31) (0.54) (0.77) (1.76) (1.10) (1.27)
Session Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 -0.010 0.013 0.033
First Stage F 13.92 13.09 13.03
Notes: (i) Dependent variable: Round 1 effort per minute. (ii) Higher values of risk variable
(i.e. certainty equivalent for 50-50 gamble) imply risk loving. (iii) Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.4 Earnings
We now turn to the effect of increased confidence in earnings. Hypothesis 4 states that
increased average confidence will lead to i) weakly lower earnings for low-ability individuals,
ii) weakly higher earnings for high ability individuals and iii) result in a higher earnings
inequality overall. To evaluate this hypothesis, we split the sample into the Top Half and
Bottom Half ability groups and look at the impact of the treatment on each group. Figure
9 shows that BottomHalf individuals’ earnings reduced by 40% from€3.47 to€2.11, and
Top Half earnings almost unchanged by the treatment, at just above €11. Table 4 shows
the same pattern of results, indicating a significant drop in the earnings of the BottomHalf
group (p < 0.05). The average effect when pooling ability types has a negative sign but is
not significant.
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Figure 9: Average earnings by ability and treatment
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Table 4: Change in Earnings due to Exogenous Belief Shift
All Bottom Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (HIGH=1) -0.59 -0.57 -1.36∗∗ -1.35∗∗ 0.19 0.20
(0.99) (1.01) (0.63) (0.64) (0.82) (0.81)
Constant 7.27∗∗∗ 10.39∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 5.81∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 11.69∗∗∗
(0.70) (2.32) (0.45) (1.55) (0.58) (1.87)
Baseline Effort Ø Ø Ø
Risk CE (p=0.5) Ø Ø Ø
Session Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø
Observations 100 100 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 -0.007 -0.029 0.070 0.062 -0.020 -0.001
Notes: (i) Dependent variable: Main Task Earnings, (ii) Std Errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This evidence is consistent with the predictions discussed in the theoretical framework
section, showing that an increase in confidence leads to a drop in earnings for the low ability
individuals who are already earning far less, and thereby moving in the direction of higher
overall earnings inequality.23
23While the GINI coefficient increases from 0.275 in Low to 0.293 in High, and Figure 15 provides sugges-
tive evidence of higher inequality in theHigh treatment by plotting the earnings histograms of both treatments,
a Mann-Whitney ranksum test indicates that there is no significant difference between the earnings distribu-
tions in the two treatments. Furthermore, a difference-in-difference estimate of the change in the earnings
between the Top Half and Bottom Half within each group has a negative point estimate of -1.56 but is not
significant at the 10% level. We are underpowered to detect the effect of treatment on inequality.
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Result 4. An increase in confidence leads to low ability individuals earning even less than their
already low earnings, while high ability individuals are unaffected. This is suggestive of an
increase in inequality with higher confidence, but our data does not permit us to estimate a
significant change in inequality.
One outstanding question is why we observe a relatively large decrease in earnings for
the low ability individuals, but hardly any change in earnings for the high ability individuals.
We consider discuss this question in more detail in section A.2 in the Appendices. In short,
the impact of treatment on the earnings of the Bottom Half, but not the Top Half is driven
by the fact that individuals in the Top Half are already highly confident in their ability, and
frequently choose the ability-contingent wage, while the BottomHalf appear to hold more
malleable beliefs and are willing to be convinced that they are in the Top Half when taking
an easier test.
5 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we have shown how easily confidence about one’s relative ability can be shifted
and how that confidence can causally influence the choices wemake (e.g. the choice of which
wage scheme one prefers). In the experiment, this upward shift in confidence results in a
reduction in the amount earned by low-ability individuals, who are already earning very
little. These individuals are therefore harmed by the confidence boost.
While one should exercise caution when extrapolating findings from a laboratory exper-
iment to the real world, our findings, from our cleanly controlled setting, can be used to
provide insights into the mechanisms that might be affecting career choices.
In many professions, talent or ability are essential for success. Thus, holding overconfi-
dent beliefs about one’s ability may prove extremely costly if it leads to individuals mistak-
enly entering into these talent-intensive careers. For example, for artists, musicians, foot-
ball players, and arguably for academic researchers, the reward schedule is highly ability-
contingent. While exerting a high degree of effort is necessary in these professions, one can
only compensate for a lack of ability through increased effort to a limited extend. Thus,
entering into these professions can be a mistake for low-ability individuals. Similarly, en-
trepreneurs, where ability can be considered a combination of the business idea and the
talent of the entrepreneur, have a high risk of toiling for years without any success.
Given how costly it is to choose the wrong profession, and how this choice seems to hinge
on one’s beliefs about oneself, it is worrying that the results of our experiment, as well as
those in the previous hard-easy effect literature, demonstrate that one’s beliefs about one’s
own abilities are highly malleable – particularly those of individuals of lower ability.
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In our experiment, participants inference about their placement in the ability distribu-
tion is influenced by the perceived difficulty of the task. In a real world setting this could
mean that, exposing children or students systematically to challenges that are “too easy”
(e.g. “spoon-feeding” them) might result in them holding an artificially high sense of con-
fidence in their own abilities. These inaccurate beliefs may be reinforced and intensified
through other societal channels, e.g. by the well-meaning rose-tinted feedback of i) fam-
ily and friends and ii) the education system. It is therefore possibly of concern that both
of these channels seem increasingly tailored towards providing positively skewed feedback.
First, in a controlled laboratory experiment, Gneezy et al. (2017) show that even strangers
are usually unwilling to give negative feedback to another person face-to-face, even when
it is costly to withhold this feedback. Second, looking at observational data, the past two
decades have seen an enormous grade inflation at the university level, both in the US and
many European countries (Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002). According to the Higher Educa-
tion Statistics Agency (HESA, 2017), in 1994, only 7 percent of all students received a first
class degree in the UK. In 2016, it is now more common to receive a first class degree than
a lower second (24 percent vs. 21 percent).
The overarching lesson of this paper is that while there may certainly be benefits to
building up confidence, when it comes to professions or tasks which rely heavily on talent
that cannot be easily compensated for by increased effort, interventions aimed at increasing
confidence might hurt exactly those people they are intended to help. It might be better to
construct interventions that help individuals develop their abilities, but provide them with
accurate feedback.
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A Appendices
A.1 Theoretical Framework: Additional Comments
A.1.1 Further details for Hypothesis 4
We define FL(π̂) to be the distribution of subjective beliefs of low ability individuals (aL),
and FH(π̂) to be the distribution of subjective beliefs of high ability individuals (aH). This
implies that Fm(πi), where m ∈ L, H, denotes the fraction of individuals with ability am
that choose the certain piece rate incentives. Similarly, if we consider an upward shift in
confidence, 4π̂, then after the shift in beliefs, Fm(πi −4π̂) is the fraction of individuals
with ability am that choose the certain piece rate incentives.
Expressions 4 and 5 reflect the intuitive idea that an upward shift in confidence will be
harmful to low ability individuals who switch to inappropriate ability-contingent incentives,
and beneficial to high ability types who, absent the treatment, would not have chosen the
ability-contingent scheme.2⁴
Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals:
[FH(π
i)− FH(πi −4π̂)] · (wH · e∗AC − w̄ · e
∗
PR)≥ 0 (4)
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals:
[FL(π
i)− FL(πi −4π̂)] · (0− w̄ · e∗PR)≤ 0 (5)
The term FSW I T CHm = [Fm(π
i) − Fm(πi −4π̂)] ≥ 0 denotes the fraction of individuals
of ability type am who switch from certain piece rate to ability-contingent incentives when
there is an upward shift in confidence by 4π̂. The magnitude of the change in earnings
will depend on several factors: (i) the number of individuals who switch their incentive
scheme choice, FSW I T CHm , in each group, (ii) the change in effort between the two incentive
schemes, and (iii) the incremental size of the gaps between the wages. Thus without first
2⁴The expressions in the main text assume an interior solution for effort choices. However, if there is a
binding constraint on effort choices then expressions 4 and 5 simplify to:
Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals
[FH(π
i)− FH(πi −4π̂)] · (wH − w̄) · ē
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals
[FL(π
i)− FL(πi −4π̂)] · (−w̄) · ē
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determining the magnitude of these factors, we cannot unambiguously predict the average
change in earnings.
However, if an upwards shift in confidence leads to an increase in earnings for high
ability individuals and a decrease for low ability individuals then earnings inequality will
increase.
These ideas are summarized in hypothesis 4 in the main text.
A.1.2 Adding Risk Aversion to the Theoretical Framework
In the main text, we used a simple theoretical framework to organize thinking about what
we might expect from the experimental data. In that discussion, we assumed that individ-
uals are risk neutral. However most of the intuitions carry through when we relax the risk
neutrality requirement. Below, we show that a similar logic applies if we allow for risk aver-
sion over monetary payoffs. More specifically, consider an individual who chooses w and e
to maximise:
max
w∈{w̄,w(a)}
max
e≥0
U(w, e) = s · e+ Ea[u(w · e)]− c(e)
where u′(·)> 0, u′′(·)< 0 and u′(0)+s > c′(0). First, we consider the individuals choice
between the two incentive schemes.
Choice of Incentive Scheme
As in the main text, let the optimal effort levels under the ability-contingent and certain
piece rate incentives be denotes by e∗∗AC and e
∗∗
PR (assuming an interior solution). Given these
optimal effort choices under the two incentive schemes, we have the following condition
for the individual choosing the ability-contingent incentives. The individual prefers ability-
contingent incentives if:
s · e∗∗AC + π̂ · u(wH · e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC)≥ s · e
∗∗
PR + u(w̄ · e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
PR)
This inequality implies that there is a threshold subjective belief, πi,r , such that the
individual prefers to choose the certain piece rate incentives for lower subjective beliefs, i.e.
π̂≤ πi,r , and prefers to choose ability-contingent incentives for larger subjective beliefs, i.e.
π̂≥ πi,r . In general, we can specify πi,r as follows:
πi,r :=
u(w̄ · e∗∗PR)
u(wH · e∗∗AC)
+
s · (e∗∗PR − e
∗∗
AC)− (c(e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
AC))
u(wH · e∗∗AC)
Notice that if there is a binding constraint on effort in the lab, and optimal effort under
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both incentive schemes is given by ē∗∗, this expressions simplifies to:
πi,r =
u(w̄ · ē∗∗)
u(wH · ē∗∗)
The discussion above can be summarised with the following decision rules for incentive
choices:
i. The individual chooses the certain piece rate incentives if she has low self-confidence
(i.e. beliefs on the interval: π̂ ∈ [0,πi,r]).
ii. The individual chooses the risky ability-contingent incentives if she has high self-confidence
(i.e. beliefs on the interval: π̂ ∈ [πi,r , 1]).
Choice of Effort
In the main text, under risk neutrality, the threshold belief at which the individual is in-
different between choosing the ability-contingent and certain piece rate incentives was the
same as the threshold at which the individual would choose the same level of effort under
both incentives schemes. With risk aversion, these two thresholds for (i) incentive scheme
schoice, and (ii) effort choice, are no longer the same.
In this section, we first consider the case where there is an internal solution for the
optimal effort level. Later, we return to the case where effort is constrained in the lab (e.g.
due to time constraints). Effort choices under the two incentive schemes are obtained by
solving the following two equations (assuming interior solutions):
π̂wH · u′(wH · e) = c′(e)− s gives e∗∗AC (6)
w̄ · u′(w̄ · e) = c′(e)− s gives e∗∗PR (7)
It is clear that in general e∗∗AC may be either larger or smaller than e
∗∗
PR, depending on
the individual’s subjective belief about her own ability, π̂. In particular, when π̂ = 0, the
individual believes that she is low ability for sure, and she chooses more effort under the
piece rate incentives (e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR). The reverse is true when she believes that she is the high
ability type for sure ( π̂= 1⇒ e∗∗AC > e
∗∗
PR ).
However, since individuals are given a choice of which incentive scheme to choose, it
is of interest to know whether all individuals who choose the ability-contingent incentives
choose a higher effort level than the individuals who choose the fixed piece rate.
In order to answer this question, firstly, notice that the RHS of equations 6 and 7 is
identical. Since the LHS of each equation is decreasing in e, considering the ratio of the
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LHS of the two expressions, π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) , can help us to assess which optimal effort choice
will be higher.
Secondly, since wH > w̄ and u′′(·) < 0, the ratio
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) is increasing as effort increases.
This implies that π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) is also increasing in e. One can think of this term as the ratio
of the marginal shift in utility due to money of an additional unit of effort, under the two
incentive schemes. For ease of exposition, we will refer to the “monetary component” of the
utility function as the part that excludes the intrinsic reward for effort, and the cost of effort
(i.e. Ea[u(w · e)]).
Thirdly, the optimal effort level under thecertain piece rate incentives doesn’t depend on
the individual’s subjective belief about her ability - all individuals choose the same optimal
effort level under certain piece rate, e∗∗PR, irrespective of their belief, π̂. This means that ir-
respective of π̂, we can evaluate the ratio of marginal utilities of money, π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) , at the
point of optimal effort under the certain piece rate incentives, e∗∗PR (which doesn’t depend on
π̂) to determine the threshold value of π̂ for which the optimal effort choice switches from
being higher under certain piece rate incentives to being higher under ability-contingent
incentives.
Define πe,r to be the value of π̂ at which the ratio of marginal utilities of money, π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) ,
evaluated at e∗∗PR, is equal to 1. In particular:
πe,r :=
w̄
wH
·
u′(w̄ · e∗∗PR)
u′(wH · e∗∗PR)
(8)
With these definitions for πi,r and πe,r in hand, we can assess the relationship between
the individual’s choice of incentive scheme and her effort choice.
Proposition 1. If the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives, then she exerts more
effort than she would have if she had faced the fixed piece rate incentives. In particular,
π̂≥ πi,r ⇒ π̂≥ πe,r
If she chooses the piece rate incentives, then she chooses more effort under certain piece rate
incentives if π̂≤ πe,r , and more effort under ability-contingent incentives if π̂ > πe,r .
Essentially, we show that there are three possible intervals for π̂ that specify incentive
choice and effort choice behaviour:
• If π̂ ∈ [0,πe,r], the individual chooses the certain piece rate incentives and exerts
more effort under certain piece rate incentives than ability-contingent incentives.
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• If π̂ ∈ (πe,r ,πi,r), the individual would prefer the certain piece rate incentives, but
if she faced the ability-contingent incentives, then she would exert more effort than
under the certain piece rate incentives.
• If π̂ ∈ [πi,r , 1], the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives and exerts
more effort under ability-contingent incentives than certain piece rate incentives.
Case 1: First we consider π̂ ∈ [0,πe,r), or equivalently, π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e∗∗PR)
u′(w̄·e∗∗PR)
< 1. This means
that the monetary marginal utility of effort is lower under ability-contingent incentives than
under certain piece rate incentives at e = e∗∗PR. Therefore, since w̄ · u
′(w̄ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR)− s,
we have:
π̂wH · u′(wH · e∗∗PR)< w̄ · u
′(w̄ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR)− s (9)
But since u′′(·)< 0 and c′′(·)> 0, there cannot be an e > e∗∗PR such that π̂wH ·u
′(wH · e) =
c′(e)− s, since the left hand side of equation 6 is decreasing in e and the right hand side is
increasing in e. This implies that when π̂ ∈ [0,πe,r), wemust have e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR. Essentially, this
says that if the monetary marginal utility of effort is larger under PR, evaluated at e = e∗∗PR,
then the individual will choose a higher effort level under certain piece rate incentives than
under ability-contingent incentives. Notice, also, that since this ratio of monetary MUs is
increasing in e, ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR, we must have:
π̂wH
w̄ ·
u′(wH ·e)
u′(w̄·e) < 1. Therefore, the monetary marginal
utility ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR is larger under the certain piece rate incentives than ability-contingent
incentives, and the non-monetary component of the utility function is identical. Therefore,
integrating the marginal utilities over e implies that ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR:
s · e+ π̂ · u(wH · e)− c(e)≤ s · e+ u(w̄ · e)− c(e)
and since e = e∗∗PR maximises the RHS, and e
∗∗
AC < e
∗∗
PR it must be the case that:
s · e∗∗AC + π̂ · u(wH · e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC)< s · e
∗∗
AC + u(w̄ · e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC)≤ s · e
∗∗
PR + u(w̄ · e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
PR)
In summary, if π̂ ∈ [0,πe,r), then: (i) e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR, and (ii) the individual chooses the
certain piece rate incentives (i.e. π̂ ∈ [0,πi,r)).
Case 2: Second, we consider π̂ ∈ [πe,r , 1], or equivalently, π̂wHw̄ ·
u′(wH ·e∗∗PR)
u′(w̄·e∗∗PR)
≥ 1. Now,
the monetary marginal utility of effort is higher under ability-contingent incentives than
under certain piece rate incentives at e = e∗∗PR. This implies that π̂wH · u
′(wH · e∗∗PR) > w̄ ·
u′(w̄ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR) − s, which means that the overall marginal utility of effort under the
ability-contingent incentives is positive at e = e∗∗PR (i.e.
∂UAC (w,e)
∂ e



e=e∗∗PR
> 0. Therefore, the
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optimal effort level under the ability-contingent incentives is higher than under the piece
rate incentives e∗∗AC > e
∗∗
PR. However, it is important to note that
π̂wH
w̄ ·
u′(wH ·e∗∗PR)
u′(w̄·e∗∗PR)
≥ 1 does not
necessarily imply that the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives. In Case 2,
we can have either choice of incentives.
In summary, if π̂ ∈ [πe,r , 1], then: (i) e∗∗AC ≥ e
∗∗
PR, and (ii) the individual chooses the
ability-contingent incentives if π̂ ∈ [πi,r , 1].
Together, Case 1 and Case 2 show that for the interval of subjective beliefs π̂ ∈ [0,πe,r],
the individual would choose certain piece rate incentives, and would choose higher effort
under certain piece rate incentives than she would under ability-contingent incentives.
For the interval π̂ ∈ [πi,r , 1], the individual would choose the ability-contingent incen-
tives, and would choose higher effort under ability-contingent incentives than she would
under certain piece rate incentives. And for the interval π̂ ∈ (πe,r ,πi,r), the individual
prefers the certain piece rate incentives, but would choose higher effort if she were to face
the ability-contingent incentives.
As a caveat, the discussion above refers to interior solutions for effort choices. Of course,
if effort choices in the lab face a binding constraint (e.g. the time limit), then the discussion
above does not apply, and effort choices are the same under the two incentives schemes.
Influence on Earnings
The discussion in the main text for the risk-neutral agent essentially maps directly to the
case of the risk-averse agent, replacing: (i) πi with πi,r , (ii) e∗PR with e
∗∗
PR, and (iii) e
∗
AC with
e∗∗AC . All the main intuitions remain the same. Therefore, we have:
Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals Due to Upward Shift in Confidence
[FH(π
i,r)− FH(πi,r −4π̂)] · (wH · e∗∗AC − w̄ · e
∗∗
PR)≥ 0 (10)
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals Due to Downward Shift in Confidence
[FL(π
i,r)− FL(πi,r −4π̂)] · (0− w̄ · e∗∗PR)≤ 0 (11)
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A.2 Why is there a larger impact on the earnings of Bottom Half
individuals?
The discussion in the main text showed that while the increase in confidence reduced the
earnings of the Bottom Half individuals, it had no impact on the Top Half individuals.
Since effort levels, within ability type, are relatively unresponsive to treatment, the lack of
an impact on earnings of the Top Half individuals must be due to fewer of them switching
their incentive scheme. In this section, we look at how the beliefs of the different ability
types are affected by the treatment.
Firstly, Figure 10 plots the CDFs of beliefs in each of the treatment groups. The figure
shows that the entire belief distribution is shifted to the right between the Low and theHigh
treatment groups.2⁵ However, in order to understandwhywe only observe a shift in earnings
for the Bottom Half ability individuals, we need to consider the belief distributions of each
ability type separately (as indicated in equations 4 and 5 by the FH(·) and FL(·) functions).
Figure 10: CDF of Beliefs, by Treatment
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Figure 11 displays these belief CDFs for each ability type separately, comparing treat-
ments. It is immediately apparent from these figures that the majority of the shift in beliefs
between treatments is due to the shift in beliefs among individuals in the Bottom Half of
the distribution. One reason for this is that on average there is relative overconfidence even
in the Low treatment, with the Top Half individuals holding very high beliefs, leaving little
room for their beliefs to increase. Essentially, the Top Half individuals are always confident
that they are in the Top Half, and the treatment does little to shift this. In contrast, the
2⁵A Mann-Whitney ranksum test indicates that the beliefs in the two treatments are drawn from different
distributions (p < 0.01)
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Bottom Half individuals appear to hold more malleable beliefs about their ability. When
faced with an easier test, they adjust their level of confidence upwards which leads to costly
mistakes in incentive choices.2⁶
Figure 11: CDF of Beliefs of Top Half and Bottom Half, by Treatment
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The vertical blue lines in Figure 11 refer to the beliefs thresholds, πi,r , that indicate
the optimal incentive choice for the risk-neutral individual in each round, r. For example,
πi,5 = 0.5 is the threshold for round 5. The risk neutral individual should choose ability-
contingent incentives in round 5 if her belief is higher than this threshold. Therefore, we can
directly read off the fraction of individuals who should choose ability-contingent incentives
in each round, under risk neutrality, given their beliefs. This serves to illustrate equations
visually 4 and 5, and to demonstrate how the shift in beliefs among the Bottom Half
translates into differences in incentive choices, which are less pronounced among Top Half
individuals.
In summary, the impact of treatment on the earnings of the Bottom Half, but not the
Top Half is driven by the fact that the Top Half are already highly confident in their ability,
and choosing ability-contingent incentives, while the Bottom Half hold more malleable
2⁶At first glance, this finding might remind the reader of the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger and Dunning,
1999). The Dunning-Kruger effect claims that low-ability individuals do not have the means to understand
that they are low ability and thus grossly overestimate their relative ability, while high ability individuals can
correctly assess their position or are even a bit underconfident in their relative abilities. If the Dunning-Kruger
effect would be dominant in our experiment, we should have seen no effect of the treatment or potentially
even the opposite. If more difficult tasks make it harder for low ability individuals to estimate their position in
a relative ability ranking because they lack the knowledge to evaluate how well they did, then we should have
seen higher average beliefs of the Bottom Half individuals in the HARD test than in the EASY test treatment.
And yet we see the opposite. It seems more likely that the perceived level of difficulty indicates how well they
think they performed. A task that feels easy creates the belief that one is good at it and especially better than
others.
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beliefs and are willing to be convinced that they are in the Top Half when taking an easier
test.
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A.3 Gender heterogeneity in confidence and decision making
There is the large body of evidence documenting that there tends to be a gender gap in
confidence in one’s own ability (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), van Veldhuizen
(2017) and Niederle (2017)). It is therefore of interest to ask whether we observe this
gender gap in our context. We assume that conditional on ability type, men have a higher
confidence level than women (i.e. ∀π̂ : F Mm (π̂)≤ F
W
m (π̂), where F
G
m(·) denotes the subjective
belief CDF for individuals of gender, G ∈ {M , W}, and ability type am, with m ∈ L, H). This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. (Gender Differences): Conditional on ability level, the average man will: (i) hold
higher beliefs about his ability, (ii) is more likely to choose the ability-contingent incentives, (iii)
will choose higher effort (if non-binding), in comparison to the average woman.
Below, we test these hypotheses and describe how gender is correlated with our out-
comes variables. Our subjects are balanced on gender between treatments and sessions.
We show being male is associated with a similar magnitude upward shift in confidence as
our treatment effect, and the pattern of outcomes observed in our treatment-control compar-
ison is similar to the pattern of outcomes observed in our male-female comparison (except
effort choices).
A.3.1 Gender differences in ability
To eliminate ability differences as an explanation for potential gender differences in beliefs
and payment scheme choices, we selected an ability task that was not gendered and with
no evidence of gender effects in previous experiments. Table 6 shows that men and women
are almost identical in their average scores (8.98 and 8.92), and their probability of being
in the Top Half of their group (0.51 and 0.49). Neither difference is statistically significant.
The similarity in the performance of men and women implies that ability should not explain
any observed differences in beliefs between men and women.
A.3.2 Gender differences in beliefs and incentive choices
In line with the literature documenting the gender confidences gap, Figure 12 shows that
in both our treatment conditions women state lower average beliefs about being in the Top
Half. Table 6 shows that the gender-confidence gap is on average 11 percentage points and
is significant at the 5% level.2⁷
2⁷If we test for the gender-confidence gap within each treatment separately, the ttest has a p-vale of 0.054
for the High treatment and 0.29 for the Low treatment, but our sample size is insufficient for robust analysis
at this level of disaggregation.
42
Figure 12: Average beliefs about being in the Top Half by gender
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Regarding incentives choices, following their beliefs, men choose the ability-contingent
incentives more often than women, despite not being more likely to be in the Top Half and
benefit from these incentives. Figure 13 shows the choices of payment scheme separately by
gender and treatment. The pattern is similar to the gender-treatment pattern observed for
beliefs in 12. Table 6 shows that the average woman chooses ability-contingent incentives
50% of the time, while the average man chooses ability-contingent incentives 68% of the
time (p < 0.05). Table 8 shows that men choose ability-contingent incentives more often in
every individual round, with a significant difference in six of the nine rounds. The table is
suggestive of a larger gender gap in choices for later rounds.
More specifically, there appear to be some men who are very unwilling to switch away
from the ability-contingent incentives to the certain piece rate incentives. A striking illustra-
tion of this is that even in round 10 when the certain piece rate incentive piece rate is€0.8,
approximately 50% of men prefer to gamble on being in the Top Half and getting a piece
rate of €1, and earning €0 if they are wrong.
43
Figure 13: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives
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A.3.3 Gender differences in earnings
In section 4.4 we showed that an increase in average confidence had no significant effect on
average earnings, but hurts the low-ability individuals. In this section, we consider whether
the gender confidence gap translates into gender differences in earnings. Table 6 shows
that on average, there is no significant difference between the earnings of men (€6.95)
and women (€7.10).
However, Table 6 also shows that men are exerting significantly higher effort thanwomen
(p < 0.01). Since earnings are determined by both effort and incentive choices, we need
to consider the contributions of effort and choices to earnings separately to understand the
mechanisms. To do this, we remove the role played by effort choices by constructing a
variable that stands for the earnings per unit of effort. Essentially, at the individual level, we
calculate howmuch an individual earns for each set of 20 sliders she completes. This variable
allows us to measure how optimal the incentive choice decisions are given an individual’s
level of effort.
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Figure 14: Earnings per unit effort, by gender and treatment
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The left panel of Figure 14 reports the average value of this “earnings per unit of effort”
variable for each gender-treatment group. The interesting result here is that women in the
Low confidence treatment group are choosing the correct incentives far more often than
any other group. The intrinsically lower beliefs of women together with the exogenously
triggered lower beliefs by the difficult task lead to more efficient choices by women in this
group. To provide a benchmark for how well these women do, in the right-hand panel we
plot four benchmark earnings per unit effort possibilities: (1) average earnings for a group
who all choose completely optimally, (2) average earnings for a group who all always choose
the certain piece rate incentives, (3) average earnings for a group who all always choose the
ability-contingent incentives, (4) average earnings for a group who always choose randomly
between incentive schemes.
Except women in the Low treatment, participants are on average performing rather
poorly in terms of incentive choices, scoring between €0.52 and €0.55 per unit of effort.
This amount is only a little more than they would earn if they chose completely randomly
(€0.50). However, women in the Low treatment earn€0.65 per unit effort, which is closer
to the first best value of €0.73 than random choice.
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A.3.4 Summary of gender heterogeneity in this context
In our results, there is no evidence that risk aversion had a mediating effect for either gender.
This result adds to the evidence that gender differences in payment scheme choices are
significantly affected by beliefs about relative ability rather than just competitive preferences
or risk aversion (van Veldhuizen, 2017). Since it is not a competition, anxiety, fear or thrill
should not play a role during the real effort task. There are no externalities imposed on the
other participants when an individual exerts a high effort, so other regarding preferences
are not relevant here. Women chose the ability-contingent piece rate when they believe that
they are in the upper half of the group. In our design, the most successful subjects were
the on average less confident women because they were better at selecting into the top and
bottom group according to their actual ability.
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A.4 Additional Tables
Table 5: Comparison of means by treatment
LOW HIGH
Male (=1) 0.48 0.54
(0.51) (0.50)
Age 25.20 24.62
(6.55) (3.88)
Effort (Baseline Task, per min) 9.55 9.91
(1.80) (1.70)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.48 0.49
(0.16) (0.14)
Treatment Variables
Treatment (High =1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Ability Score 6.92 10.90***
(2.79) (1.20)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.50 0.50
(0.51) (0.51)
Outcome Variables
Subj Belief (%) 64.20 83.92***
(31.67) (20.16)
AC Incentive Choice (Frac) 0.50 0.69***
(0.37) (0.32)
Effort (Main Task, per min) 12.15 12.18
(2.29) (2.04)
Earnings (Main Task) 7.27 6.69
(4.78) (5.14)
Risk (CE p=Subj Belief) 0.56 0.71***
(0.23) (0.22)
N 50 50
Notes: (i) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests:
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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Table 6: Comparison of means by gender
Female Male
Male (=1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Age 23.96 25.16
(3.61) (4.37)
Effort (Baseline Task, per min) 9.46 10.11*
(1.62) (1.79)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.48 0.48
(0.16) (0.13)
Treatment Variables
Treatment (High =1) 0.49 0.55
(0.51) (0.50)
Ability Score 8.98 8.92
(2.71) (3.23)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.51 0.49
(0.51) (0.51)
Outcome Variables
Subj Belief (%) 67.74 79.55**
(29.55) (26.38)
AC Incentive Choice (Frac) 0.50 0.68**
(0.36) (0.34)
Effort (Main Task, per min) 11.65 12.79***
(1.89) (2.17)
Earnings (Main Task) 7.10 6.95
(4.15) (5.62)
Risk (CE p=Subj Belief) 0.56 0.70***
(0.24) (0.22)
N 47 49
Notes: (i) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests:
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1% (ii) The 3 missing women, and 1
missing man answered “Prefer not to answer” to the gender
question in the survey.
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Table 7: Comparison of mean incentive choices by treatment
LOW HIGH
Treatment (High =1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Subj Belief (%) 64.20 83.92***
(31.67) (20.16)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.50 0.50
(0.51) (0.51)
Incentive Choices
AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds) 0.50 0.69***
(0.37) (0.32)
AC Incentives Round 1 (=1) 1 1
(0.00) (0.00)
AC Incentives Round 2 (=1) 0.76 0.90*
(0.43) (0.30)
AC Incentives Round 3 (=1) 0.76 0.84
(0.43) (0.37)
AC Incentives Round 4 (=1) 0.64 0.84**
(0.48) (0.37)
AC Incentives Round 5 (=1) 0.52 0.74**
(0.50) (0.44)
AC Incentives Round 6 (=1) 0.40 0.70***
(0.49) (0.46)
AC Incentives Round 7 (=1) 0.36 0.58**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 8 (=1) 0.38 0.58**
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 9 (=1) 0.38 0.54
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 10 (=1) 0.32 0.46
(0.47) (0.50)
N 50 50
Notes: (i) Ability Top Half: Reflects fraction of individuals in top half.
Equals 0.5 by construction. (ii) AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds):
individual level variable, averaged across all an individual’s choices.
(iii) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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Table 8: Comparison of mean incentive choices by gender
Female Male
Treatment (High =1) 0.49 0.55
(0.51) (0.50)
Subj Belief (%) 67.74 79.55**
(29.55) (26.38)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.51 0.49
(0.51) (0.51)
Incentive Choices
AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds) 0.50 0.68**
(0.36) (0.34)
AC Incentives Round 1 (=1) 1 1
(0.00) (0.00)
AC Incentives Round 2 (=1) 0.74 0.92**
(0.44) (0.28)
AC Incentives Round 3 (=1) 0.70 0.88**
(0.46) (0.33)
AC Incentives Round 4 (=1) 0.70 0.80
(0.46) (0.41)
AC Incentives Round 5 (=1) 0.60 0.67
(0.50) (0.47)
AC Incentives Round 6 (=1) 0.40 0.67***
(0.50) (0.47)
AC Incentives Round 7 (=1) 0.34 0.59**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 8 (=1) 0.34 0.59**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 9 (=1) 0.36 0.55*
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 10 (=1) 0.28 0.49**
(0.45) (0.51)
N 47 49
Notes: (i) Ability Top Half: Reflects fraction of individuals in top half.
(ii) AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds): individual level variable,
averaged across all an individual’s choices. (iii) standard deviations in
parentheses, t-tests: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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A.5 Additional Figures
Figure 15: Distribution of Earnings between Treatments
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Figure 16: Propensity to Score in the Top Half
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